Pols 371

• what does the discipline have to say about the cold war?
• challenging in terms of theory

• history, sociology. economy.
• it was something deep (even in canada)
  • a component of the culture is still present
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• eg. yesterday's world junior's hockey game
  • "never want to hear the word 'russia' again"
  • something tied into our own culture
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• a fascinating topic, multidimensional
  • not just politics
  • ( DY: liberal arts approach. that's an education! )
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• usual looking from 1945-1991, convenient parcel of history
  • the cold war is over. or is it?
  • our lives are influenced by this history. not isolated
    • where is this taking us?
    • what's the legacy that it has?
      • internet and facebook?
      • the 'war on terror'
      • globalization
    •  
    • deeply influential; a literally epic period of history
  •  
    • ( SB: other things would have happened anyway; not comparable to complete absence of things happening or other conflict )
    •  
    • in the big picture, that's something to benefit from
    • a framework from Westad to look at the cold war itself
      • but also looking at the complete picture
      • and the legacy it has today
  • we're shaped by it in a sense
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• framework of analysis for this
  • for a huge topic
  • one article, pinpoints places to discuss various aspects of it
  • theoretical framework, IR simplifying
    • making sense of complex situations, lots of variables
  •  
  • various perspectives on it
    • who started it? who's responsible
    •  
  • study of it
    • orthodox group (in the west) saying,
      • russia was responsible for it
      • stalin, pushing westward
    • then in the 1960s, american scholars (influenced by vietnam and their own foreign policy)
      • the 'revisionists'
      • saying, actually, the united states is part of the problem
      • americans are responsible for the cold war
  •  
    • • the study of this is not isolated from the experience of it
        • ( sb: nice point )
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    • then, post-revisionists
      • thinking about the international system, and anarchy
      • no one is in charge
      • states manage their own way
        • a bipolar system that emerges, two major blocks
      • these thinkers say, think about the structural constraints in which these actors operated
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• from pols 370,
  • the international system was a process
  • there were practices and principles that stemmed from them
  •  
  • could approach the cold war as a system itself
    • a way to create order or structure
    • a logic there (according to IR theory)
      • power politics, realism
    •  
    • but, very simplified theory
  •  
• relationships between domestic politics and international politics
  • "intermestic issues"
  • the distinction between the two becomes fuzzy
  • hence, "second image perspectives"
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• ideologies
  • homage to RW
  • usual idea is that russia was the ideological one
  • but the united states, really just as much, followed a strong ideology
    • that's only come out in the literature recently
  •  
  • and interest in the distinction between russia and the chinese
    • important divide here
    • questions over the revolution and the role of the state
    • while america tended to see communism as a unified whole
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• and, the end of the cold war
  • IR thinkers did not see this coming. ("wha...?")
  • what brought it to an end?
  • some interesting material coming out of russian archives as well
  • interesting readings on that
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• silence will not be tolerated.
• attend class, do the readings, participate.
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• class eval.
  • essay worth 40%
    • 12 to 15 page paper
  • final exam is 50%
  • and attendance/participation is 10%
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• office is
  • Arts 253
  • tuesday thursday
  • 1:00 to 2:30
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• style formatting?
  • one on paws
  • but the main thing,
    • be consistent
    • use citations. bolster your argument, make evidence credible.
  • footnotes, endnotes. doesn't matter.
  • but a bibliography needs to be attached.
  • variety of resources. demonstrate research.
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• liberty
• democratic
• winners
• superior
  • post world war II, the US is much better off than Russia (and any other european country)
• patriots
  • dedication to the war effort by entire family
  • and to be patriotic is now to be anti-communist
    • connection between the international and domestic society

• sovereignty
• insecure
• proud
• expansionist
• equal
  • stalin is looking to be recognized as an equal
  • and as a great power
    • being capable of stepping up; "the empire by invitation", some say

• we like to think that foreign policy in some way can be thought of as a continuous process
  • because that's how bureaucracies and institutions operate
• what's also underlying these ideas is ideologies
  • ideas and beliefs
  • this frames an international system that's about competing ideas
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• "a different world"
• where it sits after WW2 is very different than the russians
  • US experienced far less suffering than the USSR
  • much less death and destruction
    • the US suffered less than 1% of the war's overall death toll and less than 2% of the total losses suffered by the USSR
    • some 14% of the USSR population was killed
• during WW2, experiences phenomenal economic growth
  • the US GDP doubled between 1941 and 45
  • benefited greatly from Bretton Woods-style institutions
• and the united states, for a period, is not just powerful - but in a position to maintain that strength
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• the legacy of pearl harbour
  • major impact on the american psyche
    • shattered the illusion of invulnearbility
    • and an obsession with national security
  • leads to an important change in policy
    • the united states as a globally-active player
    • we're not going to be vulnerable again
      • (and largely weren't, on US soil, until 9/11)
  •  
• 1. global imperatives
  • technology - especially air power - had contracted the globe
  • changed how war is fought
  • america's geographical barriers no longer offered protection from external assault
    • G&M example - Chinese vs. American naval power  
      • perhaps this hasn't changed; naval power as a major strategic component
      • related to energy requirements; maintaining control over oilfields and shipping lanes  
  • by post-1949 - once the soviets have the capacity to deliver nuclear weapons
    • geographic space is almost entirely meaningless
    •  
  • a defence "in depth" was a necessity
    • the concept of containment is logically consistent with this imperative
    • not just defending eastern europe (and soon, germany as the line in the sand)
    • the project quickly becomes a global one
    • both the roosevelt and truman administrations advocated an integrated, global network of US-controlled air and naval bases
      • and widespread military air transit rights
      • ( compare to the Cdn. challenge with the UAE - finding transit routes to transport and stage forces )
      • these would allow the US to project power and deter prospective enemies well before they gained access to American territory
        • "carving up the globe"
    • the 20th century, after WW2, the US is a player
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• 2. requisites for global power
  • the nation's military power must never again be allowed to atrophy
  • US military spending doubles and triples over the 50s and 60s
    • the rise of the military-industrial complex
      • private contracting
      • and the private sector becoming the basis for military power
        • that's part of the competition
        • an expression of what capitalism can do
          • to innovate, this is how you do it
    • air and naval power must be second to none
      • example of the fleets based around the world
        • eg. 7th fleet in the pacific, 5th fleet in the persian gulf
  • this new strategy must also include a central role of the defeated adversaries in italy, germany, austria and japan
    • taking a different approach than versailles following WW1
      • to avoid the same outcome
    • this strategy is both military and political/economic
      • promoting democracy, capitalism, a healthy state
      • this was remarkably successful
    • re-integrating the vanquished, but also setting in place particular structures (democracy and market-based systems)
  • finally, it included the idea of a continued monopoly on the atomic bomb
    • did not last
    • and actually, the US and UK worked together on manhattan project
      • four horseman strategy (allies also with nuclear weapons)
    • and after the soviets acquired the bomb, much more challenging
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  • the new national security?
    • in simple terms, the new US perspective could best be characterized through an expansive concept of national security
      • american society and the west benefit from this technology, this social shift
        • capitalism at home, consumerism
        • part of the competition
  •  
• 3. "remember Munich"
  • referring to the appeasement of Hitler by Chamberlain
  • now,
    • never again could a hostile state, or coalition of states be allowed to gain preponderant control over the populations, territories and resources of europe and east asia (the eurasian heartland)
  • needed to meet the Soviets head on
    • there would be no appeasement
  • aggression and force must be met with counter-force
    • must respond
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• not only is there a military-stragetic component, and worldwide expansion with it
• but also, a political-economic formula
  • there's an important formula coming with it from Woodrow Wilson - a continuous set of principles that comes from 1919
    • Cordell Hall, secretary of state in 1940s
      • internationalist - democratic principles would be important to form the int'l system
      • would add certainty and predictability, and underly peaceful relations with states worldwide
      • prosperity = peace
      • two components to the liberal idea
        • the market itself creates commonality
          • basic requirements for free trade establish a uniform set of institutions, laws and regimes
          • this common reference point creates the basis for common thinking, common identity
        • attitudes, belief systems, sociocultural values - from the exchange and consumption of goods ( whoa, interesting )
          • common goods that are created, traded and consumed
          • create the basis for common thinking, common outlooks
          • creating peace, because it creates common ideas
            •  
      • if you promote democratic regimes, they'll be more reluctant to go to war (going back to Kant)
        • and the belief that democratic states, to succeed, need to be based on particular values
        • and when conflicts arise, they're acclimatized to solving problems through peaceful, non-violent means
          • a matter of political culture
          • and institutional means
      • and the idea that some of these institutional practices begin to occur outside the country as well, in external relations
  •  
  • the core ideas here
    • that there's a political and economic component to this vision
    • not just about military security
  • while Wilsonian internationalism somewhat failed (eg. with the league of nations collapsing)
    • the ideas remain
  •  
  • a number of principles,
    • a free and open econonic system was indispensable to the new order, as free trade was an essential prerequisite for peace
    • autarchy, closed trading blocs, and national barriers to foreign investment and currency convertibility had to be avoided
    • a more prosperous world = a more secure and stable world
  •  
  • international economic institutions established by the united states
    • the US gained general acceptance of the principles and support for two key institutions
    • the International Monetary Fund, the IBRD (eventually the World Bank), and later the GATT (which became the WTO)
      • setting into play the institutional mechanisms for an expansive free trading system that would become the basis for this international political-economic strategy
    • certainly self-interest behind this project; not just pure goodness
  •  
    • self-interest
      • "empire by invitation"
      • clearly, the US would stand to gain given this additional strategy
        • it produced 50% of the world's goods at the end of WW2

• the experience of world war II is dramatically different
• on the eurasian continent, the soviets face devastation
  • millions of lives lost, 1700 cities and towns and more than 70 000 villages and hamlets - utterly destroyed
• the agricultural base of the USSR was decimated
  • millions of acres of crops destroyed and the slaughter of thousands and thousands of animals
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• enduring memories
  • the german invasion during WW1
  • the allied (West) intervention during the Russian Civil War
  • the conquest of Russia at the beginning of the 19th century
    • under napoleon travelling east
  • obsesion with ensuring the independence and security (?) of russia
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• security concerns are different
  • geoploitcal realities
    • the USSR, a nation that covered 1/6 of the earth's land mass
    • had no friendly neighbours
    • and no ocean barriers that would ease the task of soviet defence
    •  
• so the immediate strategic imperatives were
  • the baltic states, and poland
  • there was an imperative to block the polish corridor
    • the invasion route through which the troops of napoleon, the Kaiser, and Hitler had poured through
  • stalin: "it is therefore in russia's vital interest that poland should be strong and friendly"
    • so a little naive to think that russia would have been fine with a democratic, capitalist, western-oriented poland
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  • and having neighbours that were friendly
    • friendly especially in terms of having a similar ideology
  • in Stalin's mind, seen as a necessity
  •  
• and in contrast for the American post-WW2 vision for germany, the Russian post-war vision was closer to the post-WW1 ideas
  • germany should be hobbled through a harsh occupation regime, systematic de-industrualisation and extensive reparations obligations
  • if you wanted to avoid being threatened by germany again, you crush them - that was the traditional idea that Stalin subscribed to
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• Practical Considerations
  • some recognition that the soviets had to work with the americans
  • position relative to them is one of weakness
    • given the death and destruction the USSR experienced
  • an open break with the west needed to be avoided
  • and some hope that reconstruction aid and hope could come from the americans
    • but as the marshall plan unfolds, it becomes clear that that won't be offered
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• "a little respect"
  • some recognition of the role the USSR played, and the sacrifices it made
  • seeking to be treated as a respected, responsible power
  • insisted on an equal voice in eg. the UN security council and other new institutions
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• and also, the relationship between soviet foreign policy and Stalin's own vision
  • link between the ruler and power he holds, and his own psychological makeup
  • Gaddis writes, "stalin transformed the govt he ran and even the country he ruled... into a gargantuan extension of his own pathologically suspicious personality"
    • he wasn't an idiot - a tactitian
    • but suspicious of everybody
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• "Cold war: Iron Curtain - 1945-47"

• since the east side of poland had been annexed by the USSR, the east side of germany was given to poland in compensation
• german citizens there were forced to move westward out of the region
  • some 12 million germans (across europe) were expelled from lands they had lived in for centuries
  • called "population transfer" at the time by the allies, now often called "ethnic cleansing" (!)
• new soviet satellite states
  • "it must look democratic, but we must have it entirely in our hands"
• early speech by stalin after the war, detailing the inevitable conflict between western capitalism, "imperialism", and communism
  • seen (by the US) as a delayed declaration of war against the US
• george kennan's moscow cable
  •  
• followed by a university convocation speech by churchill in the united states
  • warning against a soviet threat
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• in iran, soviet and british troops had been stationed there together, protecting the oil reserves
  • the agreement had been that both countries' troops would leave after the war
  • the shah was seen as too pro-german, and so was deposed and replaced by his son
  • the russians wanted to remain, and it was brought to the security council
  • refused their case, and the russian forces ceremonially pulled out
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• truman was worried from this, that stalin was intent on world domination
  • asked to document all of the past russian decisions
  • anticipating problems and what needs to be done in response
  • "the soviet union constitutes a real menace to freedom in this world. freedom in europe, freedom in the US. so we must prepare for it."
    • the report was kept secret
  • concluded, a war with the USSR would be more total, more terrible, than anything previously done
  •  
  • the US still had a monopoly on the atomic bomb
  • tests in the bikini atoll; stalin felt threatened
  • enormous efforts in all major powers to develop their own
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• negotiations in paris re: berlin
  • soviet negotiator on berlin, molotov
    • called "mr no" - but if he was "mr yes", stalin wouldn't have kept him on
    • then, stalin would come back and resolve things with a smile
  • byrnes, speech in stuttgart
    • not in the interest of the german people, nor in the interests of world peace
    • that the german people would be pawns in the conflict between the east and the west
    • returning germany to the german people, as partners
    •  
  • byrnes also suggested that the eastern part of germany ceded to poland, should now be returned to germany
    • shocking to polish officials
    • strongly strengthened their ties with russia
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• concern among allies, that poverty would drive the germans towards communism
  • thousands of germans died for lack of food and fuel
  • despite aid of a million dollars a day from britain
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• britain, economically stretched, announced it was withdrawing economic and military support from both greece and turkey
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• and the US announced it would stand against communism, anywhere in the world
  • announcing the beginning of the cold war

• is this is a subjective experience
• individuals, either individual citizens or individual powerbrokers
  • these are individuals that are part of history
  • these decisions unfold unknowingly, a product of the period they're in
• a deeply important component here
  • about human beings making sense of uncertainty
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• value to these documentaries?
  • original footage
  • firsthand accounts
    • of ordinary people
    • actors within the governments
  •  
• ( history flavoured by perception. what would a modern day comparable documentary from russia say about this era? how do past events affect how we interpret even further past ones? )
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• the process of the cold war that we need to make sense of
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• comparison to fog of war, mcnamara said,
  • "i lived the cold war.
  • people wouldn't understand what it was like unless they lived it."
  • can see that here
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• could look at the cold war from a feminist perspective
  • (or war in general as discussed in past IR classes)
  • women's understanding and experience of war is very different from men's
  • a larger issue with international relations. that stream of thinking is really only still developing
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• bringing it together, the parts and the whole
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• understanding the cold war as a system
  • framing the challenges
  • describing it
• beginning to make sense of conceptual frameworks we use in IR
  • systemic approaches - includes actors, the patterns that emerge
  • and are a product of the system they create
  • fits into thinking in those terms
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• to understand the cold war, need to understand it's complexity
  • rather than thinking of it exclusively as about eg. power politics
  • look at the various parts, and understand patterns
  • to make sense of these, also need to understand ideology
    • the perceptions of people involved in these decisions
  • leffler's focus on process
    • things that interact
    • the cold war as an interactive process
    •  
    • no one is singlehandedly responsible for the cold war
      • everybody was
    •  
    • ( sb: an inevitable process? had to happen? )
    •  
    • ( york: ) the possibility that some of this was inevitable? that we can't turn back? we hit a certain point
      • and given actors' fears, interests and actions
      • could only continue forward
  •  
  • the cold war isn't just a period, it's a continuum of history
    • been in the works over the entire 20th century
    • formed and seeded by elements that have been there from far before 1945
    • ( details...? )
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  • doesn't make understanding the cold war more simple
    • but if we can begin to appreciate that there isn't one answer
    • no definable reasons why the cold war came about
  • and being able to gauge and think about these, it's good
    • an interactive process
    • and identifying variables that matter
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• leffler, p. 51 prg. 1
  • what the more important point
  • the nature of the interaction cannot be understood unless you look at...configuration of int'l system... and threats it engendered
    • political turmoil and strive in ...
    • civil war in china...
    • revolutionary movements in dutch east indies and indochina..
    • colonial decay in africa...
  • factions looking for redemption from controlling states, etc.
    • a situation of anarchy
  •  
  • this creates an environment
    • one approach, regarding relations of power, structural features that exist at the time
  • what about
    • concerns of individuals
    • who want food, and shelter
  •  
  • and traditional IR views,
    • positions of power
  • which is fine, but leffler argues,
    • what about individual's perception of the national interest
    • or of the other major power that they're facing?
  • and so appreciate that there are many ways we can analyze the cold war
  •  
  • what does political science bring to the study of the cold war
    • frameworks that offer something here
    • but just a suggestion - just one element in this process
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• in thinking of the cold war as a system, we must have some appreciation of the international system that exists in the immediate aftermath of WW2
  • making sense of the cold war in terms of something we can understand and reference.
  • this notion of power
  • of actors that are motivated and influenced by it
  • patterns that are regular in IR, definable
    • balance of power thinking
    • a basis for what is established on the european continent
    • and those power vacuums
      • and where actors are cogniscent of these power vacuums
    • important to recognize
      • not a master answer though
  • and the int'l system evolves
    • might use the model because it's familiar
    • but this - the cold war - changes the int'l system
      • eg. the innovation of nuclear weapons
      • that changes how one looks at power or great power
  •  
• notion that individuals and leaders - these groups - are informed by their experiences, their history and past
  • none of this occurs in a vacuum
  • the cold war is part of the history of the 20th century or before
  • by thinking of it in isolation, we're not doing it a service
  • but we tend to isolate periods
• some of the concerns on both sides, are not unique to the timeperiod
  • they're a product of the past
  • of relations established through the 20th century
  • the challenge is to think your way through that
  •  
• leffler, p. 53 prg. 2
  • similar,
  • the cold war in euroep was the result of an interactive process
  • in which leaders in european capitals were responding to a number of threats...
  • threats and opportunities that policymakers perceived emanated from
    • unique set of variables in the int'l systems
    • and an equally unique set in domestic system
    • single interpretations cannot do justice to the complexity of historical process
    • any approach we take, any framework we use
      • while it's simple
      • it won't fully explain the complexity of what the cold war was about
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• it's iterative

• the first level of analysis, important - agents, individual leaders etc.
• and looking at various aspects of decisionmaking

• a bit abstract; need to conceptualize
  • (the easier part of cognitive theories, or things that are subjective, is you can experience them and understand them in that way)
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• brief sentence on p.56,
  • "cold war occured in the aftermath of ww2, when an anarchical international system conjured all sorts of threats for various nations, but especially for the US and USSR"
  •  
• understanding structural theories of power
  • Nye and welch,
    • Anarchy: " the absense of a hierarchy. there is no authority above states"
      • no ultimate final authority
      • each state is it's own authority, tied to that territory
      • but in the international, inter-state system, it's very uncertain
  • the existence of a sovereign is missing from the international realm
    • inside the state is defined as a place of order
      • monopoly on power
    • but "outside" is anarchical - order is enforced by no one
      • a degree of unceratainty
  • "chaos" is not considered a synonym of anarchy in IR, since anarchical systems can actually be very orderly
    • and esp. realist thinkers look at how this order emerges out of the interaction of states
  •  
  • anarchy = self help
    • no one is responsible for the state's survival, except for the state itself
    • security can only be realized through self help (realist logic)
    • "self help is necessarily the principle of action" - waltz
  • if states are responsible for their own survival, what do they do then?
    • they need to understand the logic of power
    • because if you don't, in a self help system, then you won't be around for long
      • or at least not be sovereign
  •  
  • question from Brad, why didn't the US clean house vis-a-vis the USSR right after WW2?
    • states are defensive actors
      • will usually only acquire as much power as needed to ensure their own security
    • others argue (the other school) states are offensive powers
      • all states seek to be either regional powers, or global powers
        • hegemonic powers
    •  
    • defensive realist argument, germany was the primary threat, and now it's resolved
      • and the US and USSR, from 1941 on, understand that the maintenance of order will be a shared one
    •  
    • and these realist balance of power theories seem to make sense
      • but when you add in culture, history, other factors
      • there's so much more to it than this logic of power politics
    •  
    • it's really not until about 1947 for the US to cast itself into europe, act as a global player
      • are they indications of aspirations for world domination? or just maintaining a balance of power in europe?
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  • one point on slides here that i missed
  •  
• power considered to be a zero-sum game
  • if state A gains power, state B loses power
  • the lesson is, follow these rules for survival
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• if it is up to states to manage their security - if it's self-help system,
  • then the key to maintaining security, and also asserting your influence elsewhere,
    • is military force
  • this creates an inherent problem in the international system
    • the security dilemma
    • "the military preparations of one state... [threaten the others...] "
    • and for realists, this is inherent, natural in an int'l system defined in these terms
    •  
    • is this irresolvable?
      • no, because historically we've seen certain states and behaviour in which states deal with this
      • and create stability
        • where peace emerges
        • the absense of great power wars
  •  
• how does a state cope with the security dilemma?
  • 1) arm themselves
    • throughout history, military force has been a key resource
      • especially for great powers
    •  
    • realist theories are really only concerned with the great powers
      • the movers and shakers
      • the theories don't really apply to Myanmar
      • ( or Canada! ba-zing! )
  •  
  • 2) form or sever alliances with other states
    • some of these are formed because of anarchy, or self-help
    • but also, because states share common interests or have common threats
      • esp. if you're a state with less power, you can better secure your own security by working with other countries
      • security of both is increased - in terms of military resources - vis-a-vis shared rivals
    •  
  • 3) negotiate arms control and disarmament agreements to reduce the threat of adversaries' weapons
    • ( usually not viewed through a realist lens, but can fit here )
    • that these are logical tools to increase security
      • not the warm-fuzzy "we should reduce arms"
      • but it can be a tool to weaken enemy states
      • levels the playing field; if everyone else is limited
    • through the disarmament commitment, weakening the capabilities of the other side
  •  
  • military capability, then, is a must for great power brokers
    • this can be complimented by alliances
    • historically, we see that as a result of these alliances being struck between nations, is
      • periods of stability
    • in other words, the int'l system is defined by a structure of stability
      • as each state works with others to stop other states from gaining "too much" power
      •  
  •  
• the Balance of Power
  • in spite of anarchy, of no one being in charge,
  • there's stability being created, because states understand the logic of power
    • and they forge alliances to create stability
  • we can understand state behaviour, given this major sort of premise
  • the int'l system creates a kind of requisite
    • you need to secure yourself, which you do by arming yourself
    • and you make alliances
      • and those relationships - their shifts and flows - define this stability
  • relying on this for the absense of war
    • having created a period of certainty
  •  
  • historically, this framework has come out of the analysis of european history
    • periods of stability over the past several centuries
  • and the principle that all states want to remain sovereign
    • and these alliances and counter-alliances are intended to prevent power from being aggrandized
    • "compelling incentives"
      • this desire to maintain sovereignty
      • and outside threats
      • which lead to the forming of alliances
  •  
• waltz 1979 "theory of international politics"
  • begins to tie in economic theory
  • and the idea that an equilibrium occurs because of the int'l system's structure
    • not unlike Smith's "invisible hand" in the basic liberal model of capitalism
  • an equilibrium emerges in the international structure in the same way
  •  
  •  
• last day, asserted that rationality is not always the case
  • people see things as a threat; don't respond rationally
  • challenges this view somewhat
•  
• waltz again, says there are two strategies that people follow in looking at self-help
  • 1) external balancing
    • balancing goes on among and between these great powers
    • this includes the formation of alliances against other enemies
    • these shifting alliances inform us about an international system that's anarchical
      • these patterns, regular behaviours
    • territorial compensations or partitions, exchanged among great powers
    • and, threats of force and even limited war
      • limited by the balance of power system
  • 2) internal balancing
    • states themselves, in response to outside threats, are pumping out strategic defenses, military capabilities, etc.
    • and increasingly, states begin to look at things in this internal perspective
      • became even more important after WW1
        • eg. Germany comparing its power with France, in terms of military force, rather than in terms of external alliances as in WW1
    •  
• the distribution of power
  • also plays a central role
  • analyzing the distribution of power among multiple or all major actors
  • polarity
    • within the international system, through various periods, the number of major powers can be defined through the system
    • polarity = the degree to which the global system revolves around one or more extremely powerfu states or 'poles'
      • ( what comes first, the systemic structure or the major actors? or interconnected? )
    • once we establish that there are different configurations of power
      • then we'll make assessments of these configurations and what it means for peace and stability
      • or for assessing the actions of actors in the system
    •  
      • the configurations have important implications for the system itself
        • eg. a dominant hegemonic power leads to stability
          • or is it just that arms technology has reached a point where the dangers are too high to engage in any conflict? how related to past definitions of hegemony, eg. the roman empire?  
            • is the cold war the only bipolar system we've had?
            • so what was caused by the bipolar structure itself, and what was caused by other less-related things?
              • nuclear arms
              • ideological divides
                • or are those a result of the polar structure?  
      • looking at these patterns, could you argue that some systems are better than others?
        • some are more stable combinations of power, etc.
      •  
        • what happens when great powers decline?
        • what causes that to happen?
    •  
    •  
    • all these questions come from a perspective of power being a defining feature (the defining feature) of international systems
•  
•  
  • back to Waltz,
    • discussing bipolarity
    • what patterns of behaviour to actors in this system conform to?
    • stability is important
      • and waltz says we should promote them for this reason
    • 1) the [bipolar] system is characterized by the absense of peripheries that cause expansionist policies
      • the nature of the bipolar system eliminates the spaces, the vacuums where conflict might emerge
      • ( debatable. didn't take into account the enormous violence in the periphery. but Waltz' focus here is on the great powers. )
    • 2) the system is defined by the concentration of the two leading states on each other
      • each is carefully watching the other
      • less likely to engage in unrelated adventures elsewhere
      • and, the relationship becomes regularized
        • you don't have to worry about managing other actors
        • it's just the two of you really
    • 3) the system is characterized by the sabilizing effects of crises between the two leading states
      • crises are "nipped in the bud"
      • the US and USSR step into other areas and work to avoid major conflicts
        • ( also debatable )
        • eg. suez crisis, etc.
      • both want to avoid conflict, want to avoid annihilation
        • so crises are dealt with in various ways
    •  
•  
•  

• ...national defence education act

• how to describe it?
• cohesive language used to express ideas
• how language is used
  • cold war as a war of competing rhetorics
  • a war of language and ideas
•  
• language, a way of bringing constructivism into the cold war
  • the concept that ideas are what defines human beings and their actions
• language to describe not just concrete things (like a table)
  • but, say, freedom
    • more abstract ideas
•  
• rhetoric is something that's constituted
  • not fixed in stone
  • something we used, but in using language we apply it (and change it)
  • we make it up, and meanings aren't fixed
•  
• the cold war as a kind of process
  • language, too, is a process
  • defines us, over time
• interested in how the cold war creates an environment
  • a mood, fear, uncertainty
• but the cold war has a domestic impact
•  
• "intermestic"
  • not merely international and not merely domestic
  • ( what a funny sounding word )
  • what's important in the domestic sphere (esp in US)
    • rhetoric is not just how the american public is informed
    • but also how they're defined - telling them what they are
    • what the russians are
    • etc.
  • rhetoric as an insight into the scope and scale of the cold war
  •  
• can go from a sociocultural and cultural approach
  • how it shaped the identity of people in the cold war
  • and the competing identities created a logic unto itself
  • defining the public populations of each side
•  
• taylor talks about human relations being dialogical
  • that relations are formed through dialogue
  • in the absence of dialogue, we "can't become full human beings"
  • taylor is a communitarian; trying to reconcile competing tensions (individuals vs communities)
    • who we are is informed by a larger sense of community
    • not atoms floating in space
•  
• rhetoric, as creating intuitive meaning among a population
  • (over time)
•  
• the movie, "Reds"
  • if we look into the US, and into Russia
  • we can understand somewhat how the cold war worked
  • how it happens, internally
  • one way to guage how it happened through states, is through rhetoric
•  
•  
• "first-class demagogue"
  • eisenhower, on joe mccarthy
•  
• jerome frank, top liberal judge
  • felt so intimidated by the environment around him
  • that he couldn't stand up for the rosenbergs even though he agreed their executions were unconstitutional
  • would too have been labelled a communist
•  
• "the captive nations of europe, nations that share our culture, our kind of people"
  • on the satellite states of europe
•  
• the fear that stalinism in theatre productions created
  • destroyed the spirit (?) of art
  •  
•  
• democracy - the word of choice of both sides
•  
• stalin, upon his death
  • seen as irreplaceable
•  
•  

• each party sees the other in like terms
• predicting, and describing,
  • and attaching particular perceived realities to the other side
• how are these internal responses very similar?
  • equivalent approaches, internally in each regime
•  
•  
• both sides thought the other side was more entrenched and subversive in their culture than they were
  • helpful as (each side's) leadership needs to consolidate power
    • reinforce that this is a struggle and public support is needed
    • solidarity, of sorts
  • and also, the political usefulness of being able to sideline political opponents with claims of being part of the other regime
•  
• show trials, in both cases
  • publicized to make trials into propaganda
  • and not really arbitrary sorts of actions
    • a necessity in both camps
    • making this incredible propaganda - and legitimizing it
  • justice - that this internal threat challenges our concept of justice
    • monkey trials, even in the united states
  • legitimizing this struggle - not just blatant propaganda, but propaganda with legitimacy
•  
• common language
  • "do you have any communist sympathies?"
  • "do you have any bourgousie sympathies?"
  • the language resonates - people understand
  •  
  • challenge is to not just identify the language, but understand the context and meaning behind it
  • what rings true when the american public identifies these phrases
    • language as a core component to this struggle
      • informs, motivates, gives meaning and identity to these two groups
    • ( i wonder how this applies to the modern day - current examples? )
•  
• identify some key words and terms on each side
  • on one hand, clear and concise
  • but also fuzzzy
• what era is this in?
  • to be honest, doesn't really matter
  • in the cold war, there's a continuum of language and rhetoric that's used that's common
  • external environment might change, but the domestic perspective really doesn't (?)
•  
•  

• made by us
•  
• examples
  • communism as a disease spreading and infecting the whole world!
    • spreading fear
      • who knows who will infect you! not just stalin - could be the folks at the grocery store!
    • there's a cure for the disease
      • the rest of the world is being infected
      • but we have the cure
        • we've always had it
      • containment, to stop the spread
    •  
  • generation to generation
  • the torch of freedom
    • the dark seeping shadow of communism
    •  
    • as darkness is the absence of light, tyranny is the absense of freedom
    • the iron curtain vs. the shining city on the hill
      • stark contrasts - instructive
    • and the statue of liberty as a torch as people come to america
  •  
  • cold war rhetoric is mannichean
    • good and evil
    • dark and light
      • no dawn or dusk, nothing in between
    • and an appeal to American exceptionalism
      • we're here, and we're bringing light to you!
      • this unquestionable, universal freedom
    • a consistent theme
  •  
  • "we did not choose"
    • a destiny - the absence of choice
    • the mandate is a given
    • what is exceptional is that we founded this nation, and equally exceptional, this nation has a destiny
      • a divine right, providential and god-given
      • if you think of rhetoric, it doesn't get much loftier
        • if god's guiding this, whoa!
        • how can you frame those who question the destiny?
          • worked great for the cold war; casts the soviets right in this
          • standing up against godless communism
    • a profoundly religious society
      • built on ideals that are largely unquestioned
      • an interesting mix of enlightenment ideas, and this strong religious background
    •  
  • fear has paralyzed the people of europe
    • we have been blessed with knowledge of these truths that protect us from the darkness
    • those that can slip from the grip of fear
    • "these truths"
      • generating this history from the declaration of independence
      • and to dissuade communism and its ideals (which are generally positive) it's cast as lies
    • and when you offer something as truths, you don't offer any other choices
      • the facts
      • self-evident truths, unquestionable
  •  
  • keeping watch
    • tied back to destiny
    • "this was our task from day 1"
    • and important connection made,
      • between liberty at home and liberty abroad
      • a conflation of the two
        • by extending the fight for freedom abroad, defending against those monsters
        • we're protecting freedom at home
      • an important defining logic
        • links realism and idealism, in a way
        • going abroad in the name of freedom, linking these competing ideas - making them codependent
          • historically, that's where conflict arises
          • when your attempts to promote freedom or democracy actually had the opposite effect (less self-determination)
        • ( the McMann piece - great use of rhetoric, insight into it. good reading )
  •  
  • all used common themes
    • the rhetoric is clearly there
    • familiar not just to americans but to people abroad as well
•  
•  
• Graebner article
• Language as a way of making sense of the conflict
  • it's now a global adventure (?)
  •  
• a central component of the american rhetoric during the cold war is framed by the assumption of soviet expansionism
  • that the USSR is, by design, expansionist
  • how lenin and stalin saw capitalism, too, was that it would be a global struggle
    • but the mistakes for american policymakers looking at this, was to treat communism as a monolithic entity
      • not recognizing eg. the sinosoviet split
        • clear and important distinctions
      • mistaken assumptions - if the USSR wasn't going to expand in east europe, they'd expand in asia!
        • not recognizing the distinctions
•  
  • dean acheson's presidential memorandum, 1946,
    • "if the soviet union succeeds in its objective of obtaining control over turkey, it will be extremely difficult... to prevent the SU from obtaining control over Greece and over the whole Near and Middle East...
    • "When the Soviety Union has once obtained full mastery of this territory... it will be in a much stronger position to obtain its objectives in India and China."
  •  
  • G. suggests that the real threat of expansionism was Soviety ideology
    • ideological expansion is a much more difficult problem to conceptualize, than say physical military expansion
      • not just territorial
    • how do you deal with ideas? cope with them, compete?
    • and so rhetoric is a tool here, used in this ideational struggle
      • competing ideas about social systems in their widest scope
    • "the real soviet danger, one that rendered military aggression irrelevant, lay in the limitless promise of soviet ideological expansion"
      • the ideas are there
      • the expansion is about a different way of life
      • ideas ripe in the mind of european citizens
•  
  • and uncertainty in their own system
    • this is before the truman doctrine and before the marshall plan (pre-1947)
    • it is reasonable to assess some of this fear and uncertainty with "the doubtful validity of liberal ideas and capitalist institutions in a revolutionary environment" (p. 22)
      • putting democracy and market systems into question - that's a huge threat
      • competing conceptions of the good life
    • and if those ideas don't succeed out there, then that threatens our ideas and systems here
      • linkage between the domestic and international - really important
      •  
• the long telegram (1946) by george kennan
  • really leads to the containment policy
  • later on, writes an anonymous article in foreign policy magazine signed "X"
  • the telegram:
    • "we have here a force committed fanatically to the belief that with the United States there can be no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desireable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life destroyed, the international authority of our state broken, if soviet power is to be secure"
      • question - how did he come to this conclusion? just talking to people around moscow?  
        • experience with soviet study;
        • and chedeynoff, stalin advisor, also casting a mannichean approach, an inevitable conflict with the US  
    • simply put, the soviets appeared to be hell-bent on a policy of world domination
      • as a result, the doctrine of anti-communism was a direct response and solution to the perceived problem at hand
    • this becomes a solid point of reference for policymakers, for presidents, and for the american public and allies
      • the problem, as depicted and cast by the US
  •  
  • what's also true about presidents during the cold war era, is they're all linked to "doctrines"
    • administrations defined by these doctrines
    • the idea of a doctrine, william sumner argues, includes a number of characteristic features
      • linked to rhetoric
      • distortions, stereotypes, political commitments and ambitions, fears that are rational and irrational, and demands and expectations
        • no matter how inachievable
    • important features of doctrine to recognize
      • based to some degree on analysis of facts
      • but it's distorted
    • and during the cold war, the doctrines themselves are framed by the rhetoric of the day
      • not stepping outside what is familiar
        • ( LBJ, recognizing that the vietnam war is going really badly - but stuck, incapable of changing the framework )
  •  
  • Anti-Communist (AC) Doctrine
    • europe stabilizes fairly quickly; no question about germany as a federal republic, and berlin as an island in a sea of red
    • and so tensions spring up elsewhere
      • the korean war
      • revolutions declared by "agents of communism"
    •  
    • the assumed threat of soviet expansionism always present here
    •  
    • as an assertive response, the ideas of nationalism and the demands for self-determination as a universal defence were included in the workings of a doctrine
      • that's where you got into problems
      • advocating self-determination, but actually working against the people
        • supporting nondemocratic regimes, and overthrowing democratic ones
          • in the name of self-determination.
          •  
    • G. concludes that the AC doctrine overstated the danger and created undesirable and never-intended consequenes
      • a massive nuclear arsenal
      • covert operations to overthrow pro-soviet governments
        • (often violating principles of democracy and slef-determination)
      • the inevitable response could be likened to a kind of "crusade"
        • that word is an important one
        • addresses and reinforces those ideas linked to exceptionalism
          • supporting our providential mission, etc.
          • in the name of these self-evident ideals, we're prepared to do almost anything
            • and not having any limits on anything leads us to violate our own ideals
            • out in the international sphere, this can work against you
        •  
        •  
• the Truman Doctrine
  • one of the most important post-ww2 documents
  • catalyzes and sets in place obligations and the role of the US
    • immediately, in terms of turkey and greece
    • and in the long run, the world
  • "necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival and integrity of the greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider situation... then, Europe...
  • confusion and disorder might well spread throughtout the entire middle east...
    • a proto-description of the domino theory (burgeoning domino theory)
    • if just one of these nations fall, the momentum will be unstoppable!...
      • and combining this back to the possibility of ideological expansion, more so than tanks rolling across borders  
        • changes the response  
    • ( see quotations on p. 25 of G. from various US senators that indicate the strength of this thought )
•  
  • the Munich Syndrom is an improtant reference point in this statement
    • thinking about the 1930s (Austria, Sudetenland, and Czechoslovakia)
      • expansionism wasn't checked in the 1930s, and then by 1939 you know what happens next
    • a familiar fear
      • if greece and turkey fall - if we don't check it here - are we prepared not just for expansionism, but world war three?
        • going to war later than sooner
    • those that behave like this - aggressive and expansionist - will only understand a reponse that meets them with similar force
      • deterrence is necessary in these situations
      • appeasement, diplomatic solutions, soft ones
        • these aren't the way
        • that didn't work in the 1930s
    •  
    • what's the problem with the munich syndrome as a point of reference?
      • historical analogies
        • useful, allow for comparisons and predictions
      • but danger in relying on them
        • no two historical events are ever going to be the same
          • exactly alike in context, history, economic and social realities
      • these analogies are ways of creating cognitive biases
        • to simplify a problem based on perceptions
        • small connections, linking individuals - eg. stalin to hitler
          • or saddam to hitler  
            • these connections continue, esp. in american foreign policy  
        • when the doctrine is based on assumptions that are flawed or weak, you get problems
    •  
    • useful formula for anti-communism
      • munich analogy + domino theory = anti-communism
      • the language indicates
        • the nature of the enemy
        • what's at stake
        • who's in danger
•  
• NSC 68 (1950)
  • why's it important?
    • rallies the troops and the funds for increased military spending
    • this is the rationale
      • sets in place the need for this spending, to create a massive military capability
  • what's most informing here, is it's rhetoric
  • at the highest level, the information going out to the joint chiefs of staff is laden with this
    • becomes the operative language of policy
  • most interesting parts,
    • who are we - "the fundamental purpose of the united states"
    • and who are they - "the fundamental design of the kremlin"
  •  
    • what distinguishes these immediately?
      • purpose - goes back to destiny, a higher calling
        • "to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, the general welfare, and the blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our prosperity
        • "determination to create conditons under which our free and democratic system can live and prosper, and our determination to fight if necessary to defend our way of life"
          • ...and we've got god on our side
          • uses language familiar to all
          • ( SB: also interesting, it's framed defensively - we're just defending the principles we have )
      • design - being built by someone for something
        • "fundamental design of those who control the soviet union and the int'l communist movement is to retain and solidify their absolute power, first in the soviet union and second in the areas now under their control... ultimate elimination of any effective opposition to their authority
        • "...now directed toward the domination of the eurasian land mass...
          • (and we'll see, from 1950 onwards, that's where the hotspots are! is that partly because of this conception?)
        • "the US, as the principal centre of power in the non-soviet world and the bulwark of opposition to soviet expansion..."
          • clearly demarkating two camps
          • this is our role, this will be our duty to defend
          •  
  • ( SB: so interesting that these are part of secret official policy documents )
  •  
  • "the USSR, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world... the issues that face us are momentuous, involving the fulfillmnet or destruction not only of the republic but of cilvization itself"
    • holy. that's a big deal.
•  
•  
•  

• "uniquely american symptoms, guilt and fear"
•  
•  
• describe and detail the themes that are presented within the film that might lead us to unearth a cold war cuture present within american film during the early 1960s?
• a constructivist approach leads us to make assessments about the importance of ideas, language, symbols and knowledge in international politicis
  • give examples from the film that demonstrate the significance of these factors in the context of the cold war
•  
•  
• plan on the part of soviets
• americans are reactive
• uniquely american characteristics
•  
•  
• is this a pro-war film? is it an anti-war film? a political statement in some odd way?
•  
• television itself, not capturing reality - shots framed with a tv screen in the foreground showing somehting different
  • can't trust the television screen?
•  
• and possibly a criticism of american opportunism?
  • the mccarthy-esque character
  • shaw's mother, doing anything
  •  
• symbols, recurring
  • statues of lincoln
  • the mao and stalin pictures - reinforcing the monolithic nature of communism
  • and the convention, the same sort of imagery
    • parallels between the two?
• messianic struggle
  • between good and evil
  • but also imparting, political leadership was messianic - on both sides
•  
• linkages between communism and disallowed behaviour
  • they're not smoking cigarettes! (as they're being brainwashed)
  • and the newspaper publisher wearing his wife's clothing
  •  

• but before that, the international foundations of revolutionary theory
•  
• the international communist movement
  • and then looking at the rift (and split, by 1969) between china and russia
•  
• while doctrine tends to be rigid
  • the point is that,
    • on all sides, (stalin and mao) made doctrine flexible
      • shift a bit as needed
    • mao is dogmatic, doctrinal
      • but shaped by the practical reality that china faces
    • by the end of the 1960s, mao believes that the USSR may actually be more of a threat than the US
      • different perspectives on the vietnam conflict
      • so tempers the ideology with a realpolitik
  •  
  • mao is concerned about china's state of affairs
  • apparatchiks (?)
  • each regime, very centralized
    • and an essentially paranoid leadership
      • purges to maintain leadership, eliminate political opposition
  •  
  • so ideology is important
    • but to pin our answer on one variable is foolhardy
    • the nature of ideology tends to be dynamic
  •  
  • and at this time, we can also suggest that the US is as dogmatic and doctrinarian as the soviets
•  

• marx was never an ideologue
  • he was a political philosopher
  • never gave a definite program on how communism would emerge
    • he gave a foundation, a bit of a path
  • but most of all, gave a framework for these ideologues
• lenin and stalin
  • who could take that framework, distort it somewhat and apply it
•  
• the big problem for the int'l communist revolution
  • the first world war
  • sidelined the idea that class history - class consciousness - would supercede national consciousness
    • in the great war, nationalism triumphed very clearly
•  
• and marx's analysis was focused internally
  • but lenin's was international
  • globalized communism - throws the solution into the international system
  •  
• lenin makes the international relations application of marx
•  
• two important questions having to do this
  • with lenin's theory of imperialism
    • the first of those foundational theories
    • picks up where Marx left off
  • the first,
    • where's the revolution, what's going on?
  • and the second,
    • marx argued that within a modern capitalist society, there would be a crisis, and that would be necessary to lead to class consciousness, revolution and communism
      • breaking through the false consciousness
  •  
  • for marx,
    • the proletariat consciousness had to be this internal revolution
  • both chinese and russian leaderships accepted this
    • but took much different approaches over time
  •  
  • class, being what matters
  •  
• at the end of the day, lenin's goal
  • was this proletarian internationalism
    • that class would transcend all other features of identity
  • set up a framework to promote this concept
    • taking working men's associations, and unite them internationally
    • with
      • a) a goal to organize, and
      • b) indoctrinate
        • creating an ideology we can tap into and understand
•  
• the basis for unity lay in the development of capitalist internationalism
  • where the world would become increasingly unified as a result of capitalist expansion
• in the realm of ideas
  • the national principle that divided mankind was supplanted by the class principle which united it
•  
  • so the revolution abroad, happens because capitalism is united abroad
  • extends marx's logic internationally
•  
• maybe, in the end, the fact that we aren't recognizing class today
  • maybe the "superstructure" is working, class is meaningless
  • we're happy with our xboxes and cars
  •  
  •  

• you don't read books, you read pamphlets!
• in 1902, wrote "what is to be done"
  • begins the foundation
    • in the bolshevik tradition
    • strong leadership, centralized
    • and rigidly manufactured and controlled doctrine
  • as much as politically high-ranking position, being an ideologue - a high thinker of doctrine - was highly influential
• 1916, "imperialism, the highest state of capitalism"
  • that imperialism represents a solution to the typical problems capitalism faces
  • capitalism features these four developments:
    • 1) capitalism in its advanced stages becomes highly monopolistic, permitting banks and financial institutions to acquire surpluses of capital
    • 2) in order to maximize profits (as these monopolies emerge), this capital is exported to backward countries where capital is scarce and land, raw materials and labour are cheap
    • 3) eventually, the great capitalist powers divide up the world into colonies where each power is able to exercise exclusive control
      • lenin's theory that imperalism will ultimately lead to war
      • war between imperialist states is inevitable
        • because of the dynamic of imperialism
        • a theory of conflict, tied to imperialism
    • 4) the imperliast dynamics for expansion ultimately bring the capitalist powers into conflict
      • which brings on war
      • this is a modification of marx's ideas, a reapplication at the international level
•  
• significance of lenin's theory of imperialism
  • 1) it explained why revolution had yet to take place in advanced capitalist states
    • through imperalism, the capitalist leaders have softened the contradictions, conditions, of capitalism at home
      • staving off the revolution at home
      • by extending markets and resources abroad
      • this would allow the capitalists at home to take moderate reforms at home
        • higher wages, shorter workdays
      • and stave off the revolution
    • lenin thought workers' associations (unions) were troublesome
      • because the little tidbits thrown to unions would stave off the actual revolution
      • preventing class consciousness from emerging
  • 2) and (most importantly) casts the developing world as the venue for the revolutionary consciousness, where the revolution where begin
    • imperliasm provided the means by which the revolutionary cause became a global struggle whose ramifications affected the vast majority of nations
      • the periphery as the home of the revolution
    • this doctrine provided all sorts of potential
      • if you were a nationalist in a colonial country, here was a huge potential
      • the idea that you control your future
        • shifting the burden to the "wretched of the earth"
          • if we can emancipate ourselves
            • ...that's a powerful idea
  •  
• Implications for the revolution
  • in this new paradigm that lenin offered, the main protagonists were not merely classes but states
    • the powerful industrial nations vs. the weak backward nations
  •  
    • Mao sees china here
      • china as a weak, underdeveloped nation
        • in contrast to the soviet union, at least in the 50s
      • gives him credibility
        • we're there. we understand the struggle. that is us.
    •  
  • and, class struggle remains central to the program, but lenin successfully enlarged the arena of conflict
    • revolutionary war
      • lenin
    • stalin begins to consolidate the role of the soviet union
•  
• profound implications
  • 1) offered a way out of constricting orthodox marxism where namely the socialist revolution would first take place in advnaced capitalist socieities, and that would follow a period of bourgeious democratic rule
    • the revolution being staved off
  • 2) it offered a rationale for revolutionary movements to take place independently in the underdeveloped, exploited societies of the world
    • the revolutionary potential was now a global one and depended upon the total world situation
  •  
  • given lenin's ideas, imperliasm elevates the lowly to a special place in history
    • modifying an old principle of marxism, it asserts that the exploited of the world become the carriers of progressive consciousness
    • imperialism helps to account for povverty, ignorance and diseas in the third world while proclaiming the moral superiority of the downtrodden masses
    •  
  • 8th party congress of CPSU, 1919
    • [quote on slides]
    •  
• key question here,
  • what was to be the nature of the relations between the only socialist and the many capitalist states of the world?
    • who is the imperialist?
    • lenin, that war was inevitable between imperial states
  • and mao was a devoted (staunch!) leninist,
    • the idea that imperialists are unchanging
    • they are what they are; imperialism is what they do
  • so the inevitability of war between imperial states was a fact
  •  
  • revolutionary war
    • lenin predicted the possibility of a socialist revolution in one country followed by the victorious proletariat of that country rising up "against the rest of the capitalist world, attracting to itself the oppressed classes of other countries, provoking among them a revolt against the capitalists, appearing if necessary with armed force against the exploiting classes and their states"
      • armed struggle is not only necessary but inevitable
      •  
    • starting these revolutions in the developing world - eg. nicaragua
      • why there?
        • poverty and misery
        • the false consciousness of imperialist states isn't present here
        • just oppression
  •  
  • maybe here's where we start to lose Marxist equality
    • making a group that is above the struggle, beyond the proletarian consciousness
•  

• stalin assumes control, and through a period in the 1920s, the soviets are uninvolved in international relations
  • linked to lenin's consolidation of the state, statebuilding
• but stalin does contribute some additional doctrine
•  
• by the end of the 1950s, it's about who will lead the international communist movement
  • china or russia
  • and mao is worrying that russia is losing commitment
    • giving in to the imperalists
    • or becoming an imperalist state itself
•  
• stalin's focus
  • on the state security of the soviet union
  • takes a high priority
•  
• "socialism in one country"
  • this was stalin's major theoretical contribution to the post-Lenin debate on the relationship b/w the soviet state and the non-communist world
    • could socialism be constructed in one nationstate before revolution broke out in the advanced capitalist states of europe?
  •  
• questions about leadership and imperliam
  • mao saw kruschev's actions in cuba (during the missile crisis) as interfering with Castro's revolution
•  
• the doctrine's orientation was largely domestic - to guid the russian people
  • by implication though, the doctrine abandoned the notion of revolutionary war, a war that would have been initiated by russia's proletariat to assist its comrades in europe to overthrow capitalism
•  
• the two camps theory
  • according to this analogy, the world had become polarized around two hostile camps
    • with neither camp in a position to destroy the other
  • objective historical conditions, stalin claimed, required both camps to endure the existence of the other
•  
  • this "bifurcation"
  •  
  • stalin saw contradictions and divisions in the allied camps
    • especially between the victors and vanquished of WW1
      • the absense of uniform support (within their countries) for political leaders and decisions
        • recognizing that the prospects for revolutions were still quite ripe
          • that would last until Kurshchev
            • peaceful coexistence
  • and he also stressed the need for his country to build up its industrial and military might
    • statebuilding
    • securing military capability, etc.
•  
• and then, near the end of Stalin's reign (1940s?)
  • capitalist enrichment
    • while stalin had proclaimed the possibliity of building a socialist society in russia, he denied that it would ever be fully secure as long as capitalist was rampant in the world
    • "to win a final victory it is necessary for the present capitalist encirclement to be replaced by a socialist encirclement"
  • Zdhenov, major theoretician for the soviets and staunch ally of stalin
    • 1947 speech by zdhenov, the equivalent of the truman doctrine for the soviet union
      • "the united states seeking world domination through american imperialism ... new imperliastlitic war against socialism and democracy..."
•  
• on thursday, the split
  • 3 characteristic differences that separate the two camps
•  

• once we begin to initiate any intervention, it becomes much less clear-cut
  • what happens next?
• interesting issues
  • the environment - Libya and its leaders - and how does this scenario be replicated when needed?
    • the laws of the strong being enforced on the weak, in some ideal principle
    • are we going to spend the next 15 years policing weaker states
      • sets a precedent
      • that others may come to depend on
      •  
      • ( potential for Gdh. punishing local members for the actions of int'l coalition ? )
  • sovereignty as a socially constructed concept
    • even thought it's central to IR and the framework of order
    • it's mutable and shaped by other ideas
•  
• who its easiest to intervene against
  • politically marginalized leaders
  • regional usefulness
  • libya being "too close to europe"
    • national interest grounds
•  
• curious why it took so long to get it passed through?
  • political will
  • ( also, one of the quickest efforts ever )
•  
  • in any case, where you violate a UN member's sovereignty, you have to do that carefully
    • value of human life and human rights in the UN charter
  •  
  •  
  • bombing crowds from fighter jets
    • that could be the threshold that it shouldn't be accepted
  • excessive force used against civilians
    • and there's thousands of cases of that
    • slipperly slope
•  
• are you willing to regularly commit to interventions
  • as a taxpayer
  • providing a level playing field to the rebels
•  
•  
• two questions
  • threshold for intervention
  • and what do you want to accomplish by intervening?
•  
• a few days of american involvement
  • when has that ever worked
•  
• a powerful example of collective action
  • but also the problems inherent in collective action
  • in north/south less-developed regions
•  
• R2P vs. lucrative economic aspects
  • libyan oil woo!
•  
• standing on the sidelines
  • so the people still do their work
  • but giving them a bit of a hand
•  
  • but, having american support does not win you political and public support in a lot of the world
    • or is this an opportunity to win back support in the Arab world
  • and, spending a fraction and just letting the people win
  •  
  • what is the cost of setting this example?
  •  
•  
• what happens - even if ghaddafi's gone
  • where does it go from there?
  • tribal tensions
•  
• the US changing its direction over the long term
•  
• air power has proven ineffective - no regime change through air interventions for example
  • but that's what's done, to avoid having to put boots on the ground
  • a fetish with technology that's overblown
•  
• letting them "punch it out", something we can't let happen, too much harm done?
  • but, intervening in a civil war
  • that never ends well
•  
• the threshold is defined by, whether or not it wins the international support to intervene
  • bombing civilians and making threats
  • that's not the threshold
  • the fact that every security council passed a motion to intervene
  • that means it passed a threshold
    • a lot of national interest and realpolitik involved here?
•  

Back to the Cold War

• continued from the thursday i missed

• tactical weapons and "flexible response" (1961-65)
  • a period where "flexible response" became the policy
    • in the aftermath of the cuban missile crisis and the bay of pigs
  • the idea that nuclear weapons could actually be used in war
    • thinking of nuclear war in a limited way
    • kissinger and clausewitz, using it as an extension of the state
  • the US should have a range of nuclear weapons, from smaller (tactical) to large (strategic) for a range of responses
  • "nuclear utilization theory" or NUT
  •  
  • led to strategies like "escalation domination"
    • you can manage the degree to which the conflict escalates - that you control that
    • on the battlefield, going up from tactical weapons up to strategic ones if neccessary
    • can win on the battlefield using nuclear weapons
  • isn't there something unique to nuclear weapons that prevents us from thinking this way?
    • not really anymore
  • options include bargaining and victory
    • limited, measured results would get us results
    • nuclear weapons being no different from any other weapons
  •  
• couple of terms,
  • "damage limitation"
    • striking early at military forces, particularly nuclear forces of the adversary, would reduce the damage those forces would do to one's side
      • not a war where we'll all be devastated, but a tit-for-tat exchange
  •  
  • counter-force targets, and counter-value targets (cities and populations, factories etc.)
  • "city avoidance"
    • this meant not striking early at the adversary's population centers - while holding in reserve sufficient forces to do so later as a last resort - to give opponent every possible incentive to refrain from doing the same to your cities
  •  
•  
• weaknesses of flexible response
  • logical implausibility of "city avoidance"
    • the close proximity of targets to cities, the low accuracy and high explosive power of nukes made the feasibility of this strategy questionable at best
  •  
  • the practical diffilculty of "damage limitation" given the diminishing vulnerability of USSR's nuclear forces
    • the USSR's strategic arsenal was increasingly dispersed
      • numerous ICBMs were protected by hardened silos and hidden at sea based in SLBMs
  •  
  • and a fairly basic one,
  • failure of the USSR to accept such a strategy
    • limited use of nuclear weapons depends on a willingness of the other side to do the same
      • and if the USSR persisted with a strategy of massive retaliation as a policy
      • shortly after Sputnik, confident in ICBM strategies
        • the future belonged to the ICBM
      • the soviets should be prepared to respond to any nuclear attack with a massive retaliatory blow
    • meaning the assumption that the other side would respond to a limited attack in kind was tenuous
•  
• the Usability problem (or usability paradox)
  • the more deterrent-like one makes nuclear deterrence, that is to say, the more "usable" one makes the weapon for the sake of the threat's credibility, the more likely it is the weapon will be used
    • when we make tactical weapons that can be used, the likelihood of them being used
    • deterrence, once these weapons have been used, has failed
•  
• address conventional capabilities
  • respond to the changing nature of warfare and unconventional (guerilla) warfare
  • what utility were nuclear weapons, after all, in tactical combat vs a national liberation army
    • "until the late 1960s, there was great hope in washington that the techniques of anti-insurgency warfare, combined with generous economic assistance and does of american-style political reform, could take care of the new form of communist aggression" (holsti, 1991)
    •  
•  
• MAD and deterrence
  • any strategy of deterrence depends on
    • capability and credibliity
•  
• Macnamara (woo!)'s logic was,
  • stability - a system of stable deterrence - depends on the vulnterabiilty of the population and industrial capacity of each side, and the invulnerability of each side's nuclear weapons
    • eg. hardened nuclear bunkers etc.
    • maintaining a second strike capability
      • after the first strike, being able to respond with a second strike afterwards to retaliate regardless - so the other side couldn't attack with impunity and face no response
    •  
    • McN believd the US would need as few as 400 nuclear weapons to destroy 1/3 of the soviet population and over 2/3 of its industrial infratstrucutre
      • setting a limit, sufficient strength
    • this "assured destruction" was the basis for MAD in which "a condition where it is not rational to... [see slides]"
      • McN being a logistial statistical guy
  •  
  • McN introduced the idea of "sufficiency" whereby one could begin to assess and calculate a threshold necessary to deter the USSR
  • issues of overkill and teh need for cost-effeciency were paramount for Mac
  • paved the way for the strategyc triad of ICBMs, SLBMs and hardened surface silos
    • provisioning things off to each branch of the military
•  
• schell, continued advocate for nuclear non-proliferation
  • his concern was that,
    • was this any way to live?
    • any way to base the security of our society on?
    • (1) it is morally repugnant to base one's security on holding hostage hundreds of thousands (or millions) with the threat of incineration or lingering death if deterrence fails
      • the cost of deterrence is excessively high
        • hundreds of thousands of civilians in the country being incinerated or dying slow deaths
        • that hanging over everyone's heads
        •  
• it's all or nothing
  • (2) a threat that amounts to retaliation by suicide is at best credible only as a deterrent against the ultimate provocation by the adversary
    • a massive nuclear attack on one's homeland
      • where is the flexibility?
      • what happens if Europe was attacked?
•  
• the movie "Fail-Safe"
  • only when there's safeguards, and when it's certain that a nuclear response will come
  • in fail-safe, an accidental launch
    • what happens then?
  • in the movie, moscow is destroyed accidentally and so new york is destroyed too
    • demands this kind of equal destructive response
  •  
  • and (3)
    • in order to deter, must be credible
    • [ see slides ]
    • if the USSR had just launched an attack that assured the destruction of the US,
      • what would it avail the US president to carry out his threat to destroy the soviet union too?
    • once the attack has happened
      • what are your choices
      •  
      • if you already know that your country is going to be wiped out
        • is it worth wiping out another country too?
      • twice the death?
      •  
      • vs., taking out a country that makes decisions like that
        • possibly to take them out so they don't attack someone else?
      • who is going to remember you for your decisions?
      • and are you going to just leave a bunch of missiles in the ground for someone else to use later
        • protected underground?
        • that's what they're for right, to be used?
        • nope, they're there to prevent you from being ever attacked
          • but once deterrance has failed...
          • once they're no longer there for deterrance, they're just weapons
  •  
  • it is generally argued that the way out of this paradox is that deterrence is preserved by the impossibliity of the potential attacker knowing in advance whether the leader on the other side will responde "rationally"
    • and hence, the development of automated responses, preventing this decisionmaking problem
    • and, "rationally" being in quotes because the idea of responding in kind - is that rational? - is a questionable one itself
  •  
  • stabiliity occurs, and the need to address
    • institutionalizing arms control agreements
    • a whole regime set in place
    • an institutional design that creates patters of behaviour
      • "certainty in an uncertain environment"
    • to set in place a relationship that's established that allows, at least in the 1970s, a degree (modicum) of relationships between the two
      • a degree of trust
        • arms control being built on trust
•  
•  

• states deal with it in a variety of ways
•  
• balance of power is a response triggered by what?
  • the logic of it as an observable phenomenon
  •  
  • not just about the threat of other states
  •  
  • the logic rests on the notion of power
  • suggests that actors are rational, and as a rational response to other states acquiring more power, then that will trigger a counter-balance in pursuit of corresponding power
•  
• constitution
  • a governance document
  • the rules of the game
  • the law
• if, in a nation state, we can create a rule of law
  • a document that entrenches (and we're able to enforce)
• that's why it works domestically
  • but at the int'l level, there's really no one to enforce things
•  
• but it's an effort that states pursue despite this
  • creating a legal means to establish a practice
    • that will increasingly become a norm
  • create an agency with a responsibility to enforce the obligations of the parties
  •  
  • the test ban treaty is a good example
    • where states came together
    • and laid down a constitution of sorts
•  
• how do we actually get people to sign on to these
  • to willingly limit their own actions
  • having everyone sign on to it
    • incentivize somehow
    • political pressure
  • collective agreement
    • not about one major player (eg. the states) going around enforcing it for everyone
    • (although that may happen in some cases)
    •  
  • all of these descriptions are different ways of thinking about order
    • but they're all wedded to each other
    • in simple terms
      • the power to enforce
  •  
  • would a non-proliferation regime be more effective if it was reflected in a system that was more representative of the int'l order that we have today?
    • isaac's comment, the collective agreement always fails without some kind of powerful enforcement mechanism  
      • it's not a constitutional order
      • so much as it's about who has the strength to follow or not follow it
        • eg. the US can unilateral invade Iraq, and no one can stop them  
  •  
  • sb, this always depends on the perceived necessity of the program-to-be-banned vs. the benefits of cooperation and good ties with states who want to ban it  
    • would be more challenging for less controversial things
    • or things with more immediate benefit
      • eg. unrestricted industry vs. environmental accords
      • more to lose than, say, signing on to a test ban treaty when you have no real desire or necessity for nuclear weapons  
•  
•  
• nuclear theory
  • as deterrance
  • and abstinance
    • (eg. treaties restricting)
  •  
  • the issue of global order
    • needs to address the question of nonproliferation
•  
•  
• physicists quote,
  • what isn't forbidden, is mandatory
  • if the probability isn't 0, it will happen
•  
•  

• implementation of detente a good example
• and, a shrewd tactician
  • negotiation is clear cut
  • not a lot of room for moralism
• using a realist strategy
  • it fits and there's some continuity
  • but need to reflect back on traditions
    • there's limits to where kissinger could go with detente
  • a number of environmental variables
    • this period (detente) is embedded in intl history
      • the oil crisis
      • watergate
      • etc.
    • things that throw off the strategy
  • and without nixon in the white house,
    • carter in 1976
    • adopts a moralistic approach
      • human rights being a key component
        • which doesnt' make sense with the strategy that kissinger has crafted
• but an interesting test case
  • of the mix of american foreign policy ideas and traditions
  • not something that is framed and linear
    • affected by these other traditions
•  

• 1971-74
• could be pushed back to say 1968?
• a different approach that's a game changer for this period
• the other reality, what's interesting
  • is that detente didn't work
    • the indended results didn't work at all
      • had the opposite effects
    • that's one argument
• what's the substance of detente?
  • there are ideas at work here
    • and they lead to policy, strategy, tactics and approaches
• nixon wrote an article in Foreign Affairs in 1968,
  • proposed that no longer should ideological differences hinder the development of normal state to state relations to prevent war
    • if the americans and soviets turned down their ideology
      • and started thinking about national interest
        • ( wait, isn't that approach an ideology too? the new american ideology perhaps? )
    • nixon is setting in place a realist approach
  • if we shelve ideology, and approach our differences from a more strategic, realist approach
    • this was Henry's ball game ("a world restored")
      • the big picture is all understood in realism
        • ( i think he invented the term; wonder how it was described at the time? )
  • one idea is
    • linkage theory
    • we're going to engage the USSR
      • commit them, through rewards, incentives, and punitive measures,
        • economic aid
        • technical assistance
        • information sharing
      • we're going to connect them to the west
    • same idea with Clinton in China
      • the way to deal with china and its human rights issues
        • is to bring them in to relationships
  • at this time,
    • coming from someone like kissinger
    • republican hawks are saying
      • what are you on?
    • this is stepping back, giving in
      • "a gamechanger" (woo!)
    • the constitutency back home
      • isn't really receptive to this approach
      • so locked in to the cold war mindset
      •  
• revolutionary systems
  • caused by dissatisfied great powers
  • how one deals with that large problem of order
    • is to address the issues that those dissatisfied states have
  • look to other states in terms of their national interest
    • what do they require to be satisfied?
    • within the parameters of the intl system that we can all be satisfied with
  • seeing russia and china as revolutionary states
    • not about the ideas
    • but about their dissatisfaction with teh systme as it was
  • take away imperialism
    • how can we provide them with satisfaction and benefits that will satisfy them
    • and reduce the overall dissatisfaction in the system
  • this as in
    • security interests
    • power
  •  
  • the big picture,
    • to bring china into the fold
    • to recognize them, establish relations with them
    • and establishing in a sense a triadic relationship
      • which is a bit of a multipolar arrangement
      • through those arrangements, stability occurs
  •  
  • detente is premised in simple realist thinking
    • rational cost-benefit calculations about interest
  •  
  • we can deliver to the soviet union something that is in their interests
    • and through that, modify their behaviour in a positive way
  • seeking interests that are
    • both self interests
    • and also mutual interests
  •  
  •  
  • ( this is really interesting. not what i expected from kissinger. thinking about others' national interests and what can be done to reduce their dissatisfaction. nice. )
  •  
  • that's the idea
    • it's a simple one, in kissinger's world
    • the response is
      • unintended reactions and responses
      • what we see is that
        • the USSR becomes emboldened
        • instead of tempered
      • the opposite of the desired reaction
  •  
• "the soviets, already in a atriumphant mood because of the american acknowledgement of nuclear parity, were encouraged to turn even more 'confidently' to the 3rd world by the american withdrawal from vietnam and the anti-interventionist domestic scene in the united states"
  • usually, we over-exaggerate the strength of the other
  • SALT gave the impression of parity (equality) between the two countries
    • that was new
  • from this point on,
    • USSR being more active in the 3rd world,
    • missile crisis, ethiopia, south america possibly
•  
• why did the soviets appear emboldened?
  • see slides
•  
• conception nowadays,
  • that each side saw detente as a facade
  • eg. US funding the Shah, that wasn't following detente
  • and various soviet actions in the 3rd world as well
•  
• Kissinger considered arms limitation treaties (eg. SALT 1 and 2) to be of critical importance
  • how does that fit in to the realist strategy? theories about power?
  • relies on Organski
    • "power transition theory"
    • case studies, the risk of war increases when power differentials between nation states are larger
    • when those power differentials are closer together
      • when nations are at parity
      • that's where a system is more stable
    • it's the large disparities in power that lead to conflict
  • that's what kissinger relies on
  • we more or less need to lock that in, an institutional arrangement that locks that in
• issues like perception
  • it doesn't matter how rigorous your policy or doctrine is
  • if you're not accounting for misperceptions or interpretation
    • it could fail to have the intended results
  •  
  • that's what's fascinating about htis period
    • kissinger was not just able to draw on academic literature and ideas
    • but was able to put in to place a strategy that was well-crafted and linear
  •  
  • but (despite the gains made)
    • if we measure it by the effects on the late 70s and early 80s
    • the cold war gets going again!
  •  
  • this perception was coupled with an assumed decline in prestige following paris peace talks (1973) and the US withdrawal from vietnam
    • vietnam had a defining role
      • a super power experiencing what was presaged as a fairly simple conflict
      • have it drag on for more than 10 years
        • problems with the US' image, it's wrecked
        • problems among allies
          • the french withdraw from NATO
            • partly because of their fundamental differences with the americans over vietnam
      • recognizing that, with what was going on, it would have been impossible ...to something
      • huge concerns about where america sits in the world
        • the US being in decline
    • and detente is embedded in this process of
      • trying to end the vietnam war
      • and in a sense, kissinger is successful
        • wins a nobel peace prize for doing this
          • somewhat ironic
    • the soviets see this
      • recognize and benefit from what's going on
      • the US' decline in prestige
        • viewed in a position of weakness
      • which puts the soviets in a position where they feel they have the edge
      •  
  • so with american 'imperialism' in decline
    • now the revolution can succeed!
    • the struggle is linked to an ideological struggle
      • among revolutioning 3rd world countries
  •  
  • and, using the periphery to play the game
    • what strategic purpose did angola have?
    • venues for proxy warfare
      • angolan civil war
      • ethiopia
      • somalia
  •  
  • somalia being where it is today
    • partly because of the foundations of the cold war, 1976 (4?)
    • preventing effective institutions from forming, etc.
  •  
• dec. 1977 from the politburo,
  • "detente is creating favourable conditions for the struggle for national liberation and social progress
•  
• should never forget that ideology is an important component of the cold war
  • may shift, wax and wane
  • but it provides a rational and basis for policy
  • not always, not universally
•  
  • but the larger picture is still there
    • a lens to see this conflict from
•  
• and by reagan's election, when detente ended
•  
•  
• secret bombing in cambodia
  • sec. of defence "you just can't keep secrets"
•  
•  
• one last thing,
  • separate track in detente
  • the role of other nations - West Germany's leaders, Poland, etc.
  • and more than just a political solution
    • economic plan
    • things like technology
    • spillover from helsinki
    • etc.
  • detente also establishes a kind of European track
    • coordinated with the americans
    • but separate
    • and part of european history and tradition

• why it ended!
• why did it catch everyone by surprise?
•  
• kegley article,
  • nice frameworks for explaining why the cold war ended
•  
•  

•  
• remaining communist states, china and north korea and cuba
  • arguably, they've changed a lot
•  
• an american foreign policy tradition that's there
  • Bush using Manichean rhetoric after 9/11, like Reagan's Cold War rhetoric
    • good vs. evil, survival at stake
  • a tradition that's familiar not just to policymakers, but also to the public
    • rhetoric has to be a familiar thing, have a base to make sense of it
  •  
• continuing mindset
  • the pentagon, still planning for wars with russia and china
    • wars that will never necessarily come
  • and seeing afghanistan and iraq as distractions from this eventual plan
  • still stuck in a 1980s mindset
•  
• and, development of the military-industrial complex
  • globally integrated into the int'l system
  • that likely would not have happened the way it did without the cold war
•  
• the continuing stigma attached to china, india, north korea
  • related to nuclear proliferation
•  
•  

Exam overview